What does the principle decision say?
In principle decision 2026/921 of 29 April 2026, the Turkish Personal Data Protection Board banned processing biometric data for entry-exit and working-time tracking. The ban applies regardless of method: fingerprint, vein pattern, palm geometry and face recognition are all covered.
The decision is not a recommendation; any processing within its scope is unlawful. Responsibility lies with the institution itself, because the data controller is the school, not the company that installed the turnstile.
Why isn't explicit consent enough?
Explicit consent cannot make prohibited processing lawful. On top of that, consent between a school and its students or parents is not freely given: if going through the gate is compulsory, the price of saying “no” is not being able to enter the school.
Encryption or hashing doesn't solve the problem either. A hash turns the same fingerprint into the same value every time; it is still a record that identifies a person, and it is still biometric data.
What should a school with a fingerprint turnstile do?
- Move identification to a card, a tag or an ID issued by the institution; the turnstile, panel and reader can stay where they are.
- Destroy the biometric templates and record the destruction; deactivation does not count as destruction.
- Update your privacy notice and any consent records you hold.
- As the institution, set your own retention and destruction periods for access records.
Gate records work perfectly well without biometrics
A turnstile that reads a card or tag answers two questions: who went through, and when? The live presence list, occupancy, pre-filled attendance, parent notifications and the emergency list are all built from those two facts; none of them needs a fingerprint.
TurniGate does not process biometric data in any version, and doesn't offer it as an optional setting either.